LINCOLN MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
BLOG – “OFF THE RECORD”
__________________________________
VOLUME 9

FALL 2021

ISSUE 1

_____________________________________
#MeToo Meets Estoppel: How Bill Cosby’s
Conviction Got Tossed by Court’s Application
of Equitable Doctrine

Stefanie M. Bowen1 & Ryan E. Cox2
“I plead the Fifth.” We’ve all jokingly uttered this
phrase. We have laughed at the Chappell’s Show skit featuring
Dave Chappell’s character “Tron Carter” escaping the
courtroom with a shout of “I PLEAD THE FIFTH!”3 But what
does it mean? And what are the implications for a defendant
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when a governmental office negotiates immunity from
prosecution in exchange for incriminating testimony?
Recently, Bill Cosby walked from a Pennsylvania prison
a free man to the shock and chagrin of many. The trial centered
on allegations made by one woman, Andrea Constand, who
accused Cosby of assault in 2004.4 In 2005, Ms. Constand
approached the Montgomery County prosecutor about Cosby’s
advancements toward her at various times between 2002 and
2004.5 Evaluating the case, District Attorney Bruce Castor
determined that the inconsistencies, lack of corroboration, and
diminished reliability of the evidence would make the case
difficult to win.6 Instead, Castor suggested that a positive
outcome for Ms. Constand may lie in a civil judgment. “[A]s the
sovereign,” he offered Cosby, in exchange for his testimony in
a civil trial, immunity from prosecution.7
The agreement was memorialized not in a traditional
proffer letter but a press release, signed by D.A. Castor.8 The
civil trial settled for $3.38 million and remained under seal until
2015.9 Before the settlement, Cosby admitted in four separate
depositions that he obtained Quaaludes to use on women with
whom he wanted to have sex.10
Although Castor remained true to his promise in the
press release and declined to charge Cosby, his successor, D.A.
Risa Ferman, reopened the investigation in 2015, upon the
unsealing of the civil trial records.11 After the new D.A. brought
charges against Cosby, Cosby moved for habeas corpus relief
seeking dismissal of the criminal charges based on D.A.
Castor’s agreement not to prosecute.12
Commonwealth v. Cosby, 2021 Pa. LEXIS 2761, *1 (Penn. 2021).
Id. at *3-6.
6 Id. at *13-14.
7 Id. at *15.
8 Id. at *17-21, *29.
9 Id. at *24.
10 Id.
11 Id. at *25.
12 Id. at *31.
4
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The trial court denied the motion, finding no agreement
and failure to follow strict statutory requirements, creating “an
incomplete and unauthorized contemplation of transactional
immunity.”13
The criminal trial began in April of 2018 after “a
number” of women (60)14 accused Cosby of drugging and
sexually assaulting them.15 The trial resulted in a conviction on
three counts of aggravated incident assault, with the court
imposing a sentence of three to 10 years.16 On appeal of his
conviction, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania explicitly held
that “Cosby failed to cite sufficient authority to establish that a
prosecution may be barred under a promissory estoppel
theory.”17
In June 2021, the state’s high court reversed the decision
and ruled that Cosby was wrongly convicted of the assault
charges. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that using
Cosby’s testimony from a civil trial to convict him in a later
criminal proceeding violated his Fifth Amendment rights.18 A
prosecutor promised not to pursue a criminal case and Cosby
relied on that promise—to his detriment.
If this all seems like a first-year Contracts class—a
proffer of immunity, a dispute about whether a statement in
the newspaper constitutes a written agreement, a purported
acceptance, and detrimental reliance—you are right. If you are
surprised, perhaps you should not be. Traditional principles of
contract law govern many areas of criminal law, including
plea agreements and, more recently, proffers of immunity.19
Id. at *50.
Sydney Ember and Matt Stevens, ‘Overwhelmed and Devastated’:
Cosby’s Accusers on Decision to Free Him, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2021),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/30/arts/
television/cosby-accusers-react.html.
15 Cosby, 2021 Pa. LEXIS at *56.
16 Id. at *69.
17 Id. at *77.
18 Id. at *129-30.
19 United States v. Robinson, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir. 1991).
13
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Thus, an offer of immunity functions much like any other offer
in the law of contracts. A person who relies on an offer, and in
doing so gives up the valuable privilege against selfincrimination, may successfully use the equitable doctrine of
promissory estoppel in a criminal proceeding to prevent the
statement’s use. But how? And why?
The “how” begins with the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which protects an individual
against self-incrimination.20 In other words, the privilege gives
an individual the right to refuse to answer any questions or
make any statements that could be used in a criminal
proceeding to help establish that the person committed a
crime.21 A person may exercise the privilege in many settings
including criminal cases, civil cases, administrative hearings,
and investigations.22 The privilege may be invoked whenever
a person has a reasonable fear that providing truthful testimony
might incriminate him in a future criminal proceeding.23 The
court determines whether the privilege is justified, given the
situation.24
Sometimes, however, a prosecutor wants to compel an
individual to testify or provide a potentially incriminating
statement.25 Perhaps there is another, more culpable person to
prosecute, or, like Bill Cosby’s case26, an accompanying civil
action offers a meaningful outcome to the victim. In the face of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
prosecutors, and district attorneys have a powerful tool to
obtain desired statements that may implicate criminal activity:
immunity. Proffers of immunity, at the federal level, almost
always reduced to a letter, are common practice to obtain useful

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 109 (1988).
22 United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 672 (1998).
23 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972).
24 United States v. Redhead, 194 F. App’x 234, 236 (5th Cir. 2006)
(citing Hoffman v. United States, 341, U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951)).
25 United States v. Pelletier, 898 F.2d 297, 301 (2d Cir. 1990).
26 Cosby, 2021 Pa. LEXIS at *14.
20
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statements that are potentially incriminating.27 Proffers of
immunity protect the individual from criminal prosecution but
can be used against a witness in other settings.28 They can be
used in proceedings to consider revocations of licenses to
practice professions or to convict in the “court of public
opinion.”29 To be sure, the risks and rewards of immunity are
several—for both promisor and promisee. The promisor is
giving up the ability to use the statement in a prosecution—and
sometimes is giving up the right to prosecute entirely. The
promisee is waiving a constitutional right—the right against
self-incrimination—in exchange for a lighter sentence,
probation, or even liability in a civil case.
There are multiple forms of immunity, and each comes
with its own “reward.”30 The government may offer
transactional immunity or derivative use-immunity. Derivative
use immunity covers the same ground as the Fifth Amendment,
preventing a prosecutor from using the immunized statement
directly against an individual witness or using information
indirectly ascertained from said statement against the witness.31
Transactional immunity, sometimes called blanket
immunity, exceeds the confines of the Fifth Amendment, and
grants complete immunity for any transactions revealed in the
testimony, even if the government finds independent evidence
that the witness committed the crime.32 Transactional immunity
is only available to state proceedings—the federal statute 18
U.S.C. § 6002 makes no provision for transactional immunity.
Transactional immunity is the most expansive, and most
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 447.
Id.
29 Id.
30 McKissic v. Birkett, 200 F. App’x 463, 466 (6th Cir. 2006).
31 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
32 See, e.g., United States v. Fitch, 964 F.2d 571, 575-76 (6th Cir. 1992)
(“Transactional immunity is full immunity from prosecution for any
offense to which the testimony relates,” and it “prohibits the
government from prosecuting the defendant at any time with respect
to incriminating matters that the witness disclosed.”).
27
28
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valuable, form of immunity for those who may incriminate
themselves with testimony in another proceeding. A prosecutor
is proposing an agreement. In exchange for truthful (but selfincriminating) testimony, the defendant will not be prosecuted,
no matter what other evidence may be discovered.
Of course, the promise may have conditions precedent
or conditions of performance. An individual must promise to
give not just testimony but truthful testimony in the exchange.33
Failure to perform can cause a breach, leading to many
consequences including the use of statements against the
offending person’s interests.34 Still, due process demands a full
performance by a promisee should result in the full
performance by the promisor also—immunity, in the manner
contemplated in the agreement.35
To say the least, any offer of immunity, whether
transactional or derivative-use, requires careful consideration.
A promisee must rely on the promisor, and in that reliance he
or she must give up one of the most important privileges
provided in the United States Constitution—the privilege
against self-incrimination. In this way, it is a binding contract,
pledging a promise to perform in exchange for something of
value.36
So where does promissory estoppel play in?
“A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the
promisee . . . and which does induce such action or forbearance
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.”37

964 F.2d at 574 (describing the terms of an immunity
agreement governing the determination of whether a breach
occurred).
34 Id.
35 Fitch, 964 F.2d at 576.
36 United States v. Brown, 801 F.2d 352, 354 (8th Cir. 1986).
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
33Fitch,
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Anyone who has ever read a Restatement then
inevitably asks himself or herself: “So, what did that mean?”
This article shall strive to answer the question.
At the risk of oversimplification, promissory estoppel
has three elements: (1) a promise that the promisor reasonably
expects to induce action or inaction, (2) actual action or inaction
by the person to whom the promise was made, and (3) that
injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of the promise. Let
us take the elements, often dubbed foreseeability,
detrimentality, and avoidability, in turn.
The first element requires that the person making the
promise, the promisor, have been able to reasonably foresee the
reliance on his promise by the person to whom the promise was
made, the promisee. The promisor is affected only by the
reliance that he does or should foresee.38 Second is the
requirement that the promisee have actually relied on the
promise made in the first element to his own detriment. If the
promisee relies on the promise made, be it through action or
inaction, and the failure to carry through on the promise would
harm the relying party, then the only question left is on the
satisfaction of the third element. If the detrimental reliance of
the promisee can be mitigated through another means,
promissory estoppel is unnecessary and unavailable to him;
yet, if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise
against its maker, courts employ the equitable doctrine of
promissory estoppel.
As then-Judge Cardozo put it in 1927, the doctrine of
promissory estoppel “survives as one of the distinctive features
of our legal system” by allowing courts to enforce the public
policy that for the promisor to abandon his word is a “breach[]
of faith towards the public.”39 More recent years have seen a rise
in the use of the once-civil-only doctrine used in criminal cases.
Informal immunity agreements between a prosecutor and a
Id. cmt. b.
Allegheny College v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173,
175 (N.Y. 1927).
38
39
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defendant are judicially enforceable much as other contracts.40
The obligations of such agreements are subject to the basic
principles of contract law as well as principles of equity
described above. Under some circumstances, a promise from a
prosecutor may be enforced on equitable grounds rather than
contract principles when a defendant detrimentally relies on
the government’s promise and sacrifices due process
guarantees. And that is exactly what happened with Bill Cosby.
While much of the debate surrounding Mr. Cosby’s
appeal centered on whether then-D.A Castro and Mr. Cosby
reached a formal agreement (as memorialized in a press
release), Pennsylvania’s highest court found the post-hoc
attempts to explain the alleged agreement or characterize it
largely immaterial.41 Focusing instead on principles of equity in
the contract, the court looked at the elements of promissory
estoppel. The court noted the District Attorney’s “patent intent
to induce Cosby’s reliance upon the non-prosecution
decision.”42 Indeed, the court found that Cosby‘s deposition
testimony came from his reasonable belief that D.A. Castor’s
decision not to prosecute him meant that the potential risk of
criminal punishment no longer existed43. Cosby actually relied,
to his detriment, upon the assertion that he would not be
prosecuted.44 The deposition testimony provided Constand’s
civil attorneys with evidence of past use of drugs to facilitate
sexual assaults.45 This information hindered his ability to
defend the suit.46 That met the first element of a promissory
estoppel claim—actual reliance on a promise.
Contract law instructs us the next question we must ask
is whether that reliance was reasonably expected by the

State v. Howington, 907 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tenn. 1995).
Cosby, 2021 Pa. LEXIS at *104.
42 Id.
43 Id. at *111.
44 Id. at *112.
45 Id.
46 Id.
40
41

#METOO MEETS ESTOPPEL

263

promisor.47 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it was.
The record, the court said, left no doubt that D.A. Castor
reasonably expected, and in fact intended Mr. Cosby to waive
his Fifth Amendment right. His actions were specifically
designed to reach such a result.48 D.A. Castor expected and
indeed hoped that Mr. Cosby would rely on the promise of nonprosecution to secure a favorable outcome in a future civil suit
with Ms. Constand as a plaintiff.49
Finally, detrimental reliance requires a reasonable
reliance by the promisee. The court examined whether Mr.
Cosby’s waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege was a
reasonable reliance on D.A. Castor’s promise of nonprosecution.50 The court held Mr. Cosby relied on the advice of
his counsel in deciding to waive his privilege as well as a
promise of a public official.51 This is a reasonable decision based
on all available information and advice.52 Indeed, Mr. Cosby's
reliance must be reasonable because to hold otherwise would
mean anyone in a similar position should disbelieve an elected
district attorney’s public statement and ignore the wisdom of
his own counsel.53 The court found such understanding of the
word “reasonableness” untenable.54 In other words, Mr. Cosby
successfully proved each element of a claim of promissory
estoppel. The use of his deposition testimony against him at a
subsequent criminal trial was improper, and the appropriate
remedy was specific performance—adherence to the agreement
not to prosecute Mr. Cosby.55 Mr. Cosby walked free.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
48 Cosby, 2021 Pa. LEXIS at *113.
49 Id.
50 Id. at *113.
51 Id. at *114.
52 Id.
53 Id. at *115.
54 Id.
55 Id. at *120.
47
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After covering the “how” question, you may still be
asking “why?” The answer lies in public policy, and much like
promissory estoppel, equity. Acknowledging prosecutors'
tremendous discretion and authority, the Supreme Court
recognizes a special weight must be accorded their
assurances.56 Indeed, public policy requires enforcing a
prosecutor’s promise reasonably relied upon by a defendant.
State and federal prosecutors grow increasingly reliant on
proffers of immunity in exchange for testimony to convict a
person posing a bigger threat to the public. Due process
demands the value of the tool must be balanced against the
waiver of a constitutional privilege. The usefulness of
immunity agreements—a weapon for prosecutors to secure
necessary information—would be neutralized if the promise is
perceived as unreliable.57 Citizens must be able to rely on the
promise of a public official; the public justifiably expects to rely
on the promise of these individuals when waiving a
constitutional privilege.58 Indeed, the "why" is perhaps the most
important part. Prosecutors value immunity agreements, and
so do defendants. Just as a prosecutor must rely on performance
of the promise, so too must a defendant. Though the result in
Pennsylvania v. Cosby seems unfathomable, that is, a man
accused of sexually assaulting at least 60 women walked free
after a jury of his peers found him guilty, the result is rooted in
principles of law. Society should, and must, protect the
constitutional rights of the people. State prosecutors must use
necessary tools, including proffers of immunity, to secure
public safety. In turn, we must have faith in the word of state
actors and reasonable reliance on those agreements. Due
process depends upon it.

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
Bowers v. State, 500 N.E.2d 203, 204 (Ind. 1986) (quoting Dube v.
State, 275 N.E. 2d 7, 11 (Ind. 1971).
58 Bowers, 500 N.E.2d at 204.
56
57

